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Abstract: Much of the macro literature on the recent Asian crisis argues that a major cause 
was over borrowing and over investment encouraged by poor supervision and the resulting 
moral hazard problem. Surprisingly however there is little firm-level evidence to corroborate 
this. The present paper examines the extent to which firms in these countries had deviated 
from their optimal levels of leverage and also the determinants of their ability to adjust their 
capital structure. Results obtained using the Worldscope firm-level panel data for the four of 
the worst affected countries suggest that higher quality firms had lower optimal leverage 
while firms with excess capital stock had higher optimal leverage required to finance this 
capital expenditire. Further, there are signs of corporate inertia in the worst affected countries 
exhibiting very slow adjustment processes in their capital structure. This result holds even for 
those firms potentially better placed to control their levels of leverage. These results seem to 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the existing literature on the recent Asian crisis focuses on the macroeconomic 
problems of the economies. These highlight the problem of bad loans and moral hazard at the 
aggregate level as the common source of excessive borrowing and over-investment (e.g., 
Krugman, 1998c; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999a). There is however very little firm-
level analysis of this, and thus far there is an absence in the literature of any analysis of the 
behaviour of leverage at the firm level, and the extent to which firms attempted to change 
their behaviour in the face of the crisis. This is precisely what the present paper aims to do, 
with particular focus on the process of adjustment towards an optimum leverage in a dynamic 
framework.  
In doing so, the paper draws together primarily two strands of the literature. First, a 
key macroeconomic argument of the recent Asian Crisis has been that the moral hazard in the 
loan market was created by future bail-out policy of the government and the lack of 
supervision in poorly regulated economies. The result was financing of unprofitable projects 
and cash shortfalls with external borrowing causing overinvestment and lower returns, paving 
the way for the crisis.  
Secondly, there is a relatively large literature on the choice of  optimum capital 
structure in corporate finance.
2 In a world of fully informed investors, no taxes and risk-free 
debt, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that firm value and in particular equity value is 
determined without regard to the firms’ capital structure. Thus leverage will be independent 
of firm value. 
In the trade-off models, firms obtain optimal leverage by comparing the costs and 
benefits of an additional unit of debt. Costs of debt include costs of potential bankruptcy and 
also the costs due to agency conflicts (if there are informational problems) between the agents 
involved (e.g., managers/shareholders/lenders). At the leverage optimum marginal costs will 
be equated to marginal benefits of an additional unit of debt. Considerations of bankruptcy 
                                                 
2 Though there is a sizeable literature on the theory and evidence on optimal capital structure, most analyses are 
done in static framework and that too primarily for the US corporations (e.g., see Titman and Wessels, 1988) 
and other industrialised countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) with the single exception of Welch (2004) who 
examined the debt ratio dynamics for US corporations. .    2 
and agency costs will however modify the central hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). For example, in the presence of asymmetric information, retained earnings and debt 
could be regarded as better financing tools than new equity, especially when the equity is 
under priced. Secondly, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, there is a limit to how much 
risky debt can be issued before new equity is preferred. Thus leverage will be dependent on 
the net present value (NPV) so that firms with higher NPV are more likely to issue higher 
debt. This is the focus of a number of theoretical papers on optimal choice of leverage under 
asymmetric information. As in Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) model too predicts a 
positive correlation between firm quality and leverage. Similar arguments are found in 
Brennan and Kraus (1987), Kale and Noe (1991).  
The dynamic extension of the static theory of optimal capital structure
3 involves 
hypothesising (right word) an adjustment process, where the observed capital  structure, 
adjusts towards a long-run optimum (determined by observed internal and external factors). 
There is a relatively limited literature on dynamic  modelling of capital structure, and the 
focus of such work is generally the transaction costs associated with the adjustment process. 
For example, Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) argue that even small recapitalization 
costs could lead to wide swings in a firm’s debt ratio over time. Conversely, Leland (1998) 
emphasizes the role of agency costs of debt  in determining optimal leverage. A common 
theme in the existing theoretical and empirical literature is that transaction costs and capital 
market imperfections lead to firms having sub-optimal levels of capital, while in the SE 
Asian case there is evidence that the reverse is true. The moral hazard problems of corporate 
borrowing in the East Asian economies indulged in excessive borrowing thus resulting  in 
actual capital stock exceeding the optimal. In this context, it is important to consider the 
extent to which firms had deviated from their optimal levels of capital and what, if any, 
determines their inclination to adjust their capital structure. This is an issue which is often 
overlooked in the dynamic adjustment literature and we aim to bridge this gap of the 
literature.  
                                                 
3 The alternative theory of firm financing relates to Pecking Order of funds (Myers, 1984). Pecking Order arises 
if the costs of issuing new equity outweigh other costs and benefits of dividends and debt. Financing costs that 
produce Pecking order include transaction costs of new issues and the costs that arise from managers’ access to 
superior information about firms’ prospects and value of its risky securities. Hence, firms may finance new 
investment first with riskless debt, then with risky debt and finally under duress with equity. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) further argued that Pecking Order of funds will be retained even with this adverse selection problem. 
Unlike the trade-off theory, however the Pecking Order theory does not explain a target level of optimal 
leverage.   3 
Our analysis is based on the recent Worldscope firm-level data from four worst 
affected countries, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. We then compare the 
capital structure adjustment behaviour of firms in these countries with those in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan, countries those were relatively unaffected by the Crisis.  Results 
suggest that optimal leverage was lower for firms with higher market valuation and for given 
market valuation was higher for firms with excess capital stock. Dynamic estimates of speed 
of adjustment however suggests a kind of corporate inertia, especially among larger firms in 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, more profitable firms in Malaysia, firms with negative equity 
valuation in Indonesia and Thailand and even firms with higher stock returns in Thailand. In 
contrast, these problems were almost nonexistent in the relatively unaffected countries. These 
results seem to strengthen the moral hazard argument of bad loans in poorly regulated and 
supervised East Asian economies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and 
specifies the analytical model. Section 3 analyses the data while section 4 explains the 




2.   DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis is based on the Worldscope firm-level data. Here we extend the Worldscope 
firm-level data used in Driffield and Pal (2001, 2004) in two ways: (a) in addition to 
countries badly affected by the crisis, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, we 
include Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which were relatively unaffected by the crisis 
and label them as ‘comparator countries’. (b) Our previous analysis was based on firm 
performance during 1989-97 periods. We now update the data to cover the post-crisis period 
1998-2002. The latter enables us to trace the patterns of recovery, if any, in these countries. 
The number of firms in each country with and without outliers is summarised in Table 1 for 
each year. However, there is a problem of missing observations for many firms, especially 
during the early years, e.g., 1989-93. This was particularly problematic for our dynamic 
analysis which requires firms with relevant information for at least four consecutive years. 
Accordingly, we had to create a sub-sample for firms with at least four consecutive years of 
information, which resulted in smaller number of firms for each country (see Appendix Table 
A1).     4 
  The initial analysis commences by considering the distribution of internal and 
external funds before (1989-97) and after (1998-2002) the crisis as summarised in Table 2. In 
general there was a greater dependence on external finance in all countries in the pre-crisis 
period. External  finance accounted for 60% of total finance in Korea followed by Thailand 
(35%) and Indonesia (33%). After the crisis, the average ratio of external finance in total 
finance declined, decreased by some 22% in Indonesia, 20% in Thailand, 17% in Korea and 
9% in Malaysia. In contrast, the average share of external finance in total finance in the least 
affected countries was modest and did not change perceptibly after the crisis.  
Secondly, we consider the composition of debt and equity in external finance. Among 
the worst affected countries, Korean, Indonesian and Thai firms had on average much higher 
reliance (60%-90%) on debt finance. In comparison, the average share of debt finance was 
only 38% in Malaysia. Following the crisis, however, the share of debt decreased in Korea 
and Malaysia, though not in Indonesia and Thailand. Compared with the worst affected 
countries, Singapore and  Hong Kong had a more even distribution of external finance 
between new debt and new equity, though Taiwanese firms had on an average a higher 
reliance on debt finance as well. In all these comparator countries there was a slight decline 
in average share of new debt in total external finance after the crisis. 
  In order to understand the gradual development of the crisis during 1989-97, we next 
subdivide the pre-crisis period into two sub-periods: (a) 1989-94: we consider this as 
‘normal’ period before the symptoms of crisis started appearing and (b) 1995-97: we label it 
as  ‘build-up to the crisis’ period. Finally we   compare  the  period-specific averages  of 
leverage and some useful indicators of firm performance during these pre-crisis sub-periods 
with those in the post-crisis period. Two alternative definitions of leverage are considered 
here: (i) book value of total debt divided by book value of total debt & market value of equity 
and (ii) total liability divided by total assets. Alongside the leverage, we consider the average 
share of tangible assets in total assets as an indicator of productive investment. Finally, we 
also consider the ability of an average firm to cover its liabilities. In this respect, we examine 
three possible indicators, namely,  cash flow to current liabilities (generally used  as an 
indicator of potential bankruptcy), interest coverage and debt coverage ratios ( common 
indicators of default probability) over these sub-periods. This information is summarised in 
Table 3. Compared with 1989-94 period, average debt-equity ratio increased in all the sample   5 
countries in the run up to the crisis period 1995-97.
4 While the reasons for high leverage may 
vary from country to country, it is well documented that many East Asian corporations were 
heavily reliant on debt during this period.  Explanations  for this  may  include: the large 
shareholders’ desire to keep control of the management by preventing dilution of their 
ownership; low real interest rates on bank loans; and poor financial and corporate governance 
which resulted in over lending by banks. There is evidence that firms in all countries except 
Korea took some steps to reduce their levels of short term debt immediately before the crisis. 
Compared with the earlier period, the ratio of current to total liabilities dropped in the 
remaining countries. As against this significant increase in average leverage in all countries, 
there was only  a marginal increase in tangible assets in Korea, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand while in other countries the share of tangible assets fell. There were further signs of 
problems among the firms in sample countries. For example, average value of cash flow to 
current liabilities declined in all countries, but more significantly in Indonesia and Thailand, 
the worst affected countries. This indicates the levels of financial distress that the firms were 
operating under during the 1995-97 period, especially those in the worst affected countries. 
There were further problems as both interest coverage (interest payments as a share of EBIT) 
and debt coverage (interest payments plus principal as a share of EBIT) significantly 
increased in all sample countries apart from Hong Kong.  
It is possible to detect some signs of recovery in all of the worst affected countries in 
the post-crisis period. For example, the average debt-equity ratio decreased while share of 
tangible assets slowly increased in all these countries. It was accompanied by a declining 
trend in interest and debt coverage ratios. Also, the problem of falling cash flow in relation to 
current liability was to some extent corrected in Korea and Thailand in the post-crisis period.    
Similar patterns can be detected if one examines the year-to-year fluctuations of 
leverage rates in these countries. Table 4 summarises the mean, minimum, maximum and the 
range (the difference between maximum and minimum) for each country over the sample 
period. The f luctuations in leverage levels were far greater in firms in the worst affected 
countries, and were greater in the period leading up to the crisis. In addition, many firms in 
                                                 
4One could argue that excessive dollar borrowings could make the corporate sector vulnerable to sudden 
currency fluctuations. Though we do not have data on foreign loans, the increase in average DE during 1995-97 
was in part due to a sudden rise in value of debt in 1997 attributable to the collapse of exchange rates. A rapid 
rise in the value of debt was due to the revaluation of dollar-dominated debt which was unhedged. In part this 
increase in DE during this period was also in part due to a decline in equity value (see further discussion later in 
the section).  
   6 
the worst affected countries demonstrated a negative equity values
5 in the build-up to the 
crisis period, generally after 1994. One exception is Korea where firms seem to have the 
problem of negative equity from as early as 1989 (though the problem worsened in 1997). 
With a rapid depreciation of currencies exchange rate, some firms became technically 
insolvent which could partly be reflected in negative equity valuations, which in turn 
increased the range. There is not much evidence that the range narrowed significantly in any 
of these worst affected countries even in the post-crisis period.  
Finally, Figure 1 shows the trend in average annual debt-equity ratios while Figure 2 
shows the trend in share of tangible assets to total assets over the 14-years period 1989-2002. 
These figures clearly demonstrate that compared with other sample countries, Korean firms 
on an average maintained a much higher debt-equity ratio over much of the pre-crisis period. 
Also, while average debt-equity ratios increased dramatically from 1993 onwards, especially 
in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, they  were accompanied by only modest 
increases in share of tangible assets. In contrast, average share of tangible assets were much 
higher in Hong Kong and Taiwan over this period, with much smaller fluctuations in both 
average debt equity ratios and share of tangible assets. After the crisis, the average debt-
equity ratio plunged most visibly in Korea and Indonesia, but also in most other countries, 




3. A Dynamic Analysis of Corporate leverage   
Existing empirical research on the dynamics of firm’s capital structure is often limited by the 
absence of long panel data as well as unavailability of certain key variables. Most existing 
analysis is based on the hypothesis of a target leverage level for the firm, tested cross 
sectionally within a country, usually the US (e.g., Welch, 2004)
6 or UK. Thus these cross 
sectional analyses omit a good deal of necessary information. More recently, in order to 
increase the degrees of freedom in such studies, data have been pooled, but then these models 
ignore the possibility of serial correlation, or structural breaks between years. More 
                                                 
5 Number of observations in each sample with negative equity are as follows:  5.3% in Korea and Thailand, 
7.5% in Indonesia and 4.7% in Malaysia. In comparison, number of observations in the countries least affected 
by the Crisis was much smaller: only 0.2% in Taiwan, 0.6% in Singapore and 1.2% in Hong Kong.  
6 In examining the debt ratio dynamics for the US corporations, Welch focuses on the role of stock returns and  
argues that firms do not immediately readjust. Firms whose debt ratio increase (decrease) because of poor 
(good) stock returns performances seem to use their issuing activities not to readjust, but to amplify the stock 
return changes.    7 
importantly, because of the latent variable problem, many studies tend to use observed debt 
level as a proxy for optimal debt level (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995, Hovakimian et al, 2001) and then explain how firms periodically adjust their capital 
structures toward a target ratio (that reflects the costs and benefits of debt financing found in 
the static trade-off models).  
However, firms may not find it easy to adjust their debt ratios frequently or fully, 
even if they are aware of the implied inefficiency. Thus it is also important to establish the 
speed of the adjustment process as well as the determinants of the speed. Among the existing 
studies Heshmati (2001) attempts to differentiate between the observed and the estimated 
optimal debt ratio levels, and determines the speed of adjustment for the micro and small 
Swedish firms during the period 1994-97. We are, however, not aware of any study analysing 
the case of East Asian firms as is presented here. 
 
3.1. A Model of Dynamic Adjustment 
Our central focus is on the moral hazard problem as the common source of excessive external 
borrowing in a poorly supervised and regulated economy. If private agents act under the 
presumption that there exists public guarantees on corporate and financial investment, return 
on domestic assets is perceived as implicitly insured against adverse circumstances. In 
circumstances where lenders are willing to lend against future bail out revenue, unprofitable 
projects and cash shortfalls would be refinanced through external borrowing. This generates 
excessive corporate leverage, without significant growth of tangible assets. In this context, 
we examine the process of adjustment of actual leverage towards the optimum. 
Let the optimal leverage of a firm i at time t be  *
it DE , which varies across firms as 
well as over time.
7 In the absence of any market imperfection, and with instantaneous 
adjustment, the observed leverage of firm i at time t  it DE would be equal to its optimal, i.e. 
*
it it DE DE = . If, however, adjustments are costly, for example due to agency or transaction 
costs)  *
it it DE DE <  or if loans are not well-regulated (e.g., due to moral hazards problems), 
*
it it DE DE > . In either case, firms may fail to adjust completely to the optimal level.  
                                                 
7 It, however, follows from the analysis of our data (see section 3) that there is limited fluctuations in the firm 
leverage level from year to year, especially during 1989-93/94 and accordingly we argue that there is a concept 
of firm-specific optimal leverage in the normal years that does not fluctuate from year to year.    8 
In these circumstances, the movement of leverage rates over time becomes a partial 
adjustment process, of the form:   
it it it it DE DE DE e b a + - + = D - ) ( 1
*        (1) 
where the speed of adjustment of a firm i in period t is given by b. If  b = 1, i-th firm will take 
one period to adjust its leverage to its optimum within period t. If, however, b <1, then the 
adjustment from year t-1 to t falls short of the adjustment required to attain the target. In 
contrast, b could also exceed unity suggesting that the firm over-adjusts beyond the optimum 
and is still not at the optimum. Thus b measures the degree of adjustment per period and can 
therefore be alternatively known as the speed of adjustment. It is possible that the speed of 
adjustment b would vary with the factors affecting the externality of adjustment in poorly 
supervised and regulated economies, for example. The extensions to this model are developed 
in two stages as discussed in the following subsections 3.1.1. and 3.1.2. 
 
 
3.1.1. Determination of optimum leverage  
Determination of optimum leverage is central to an understanding of the process of 
adjustment of the actual leverage to the optimum. Most existing studies tend to use observed 
leverage to generate predictions or estimates of the optimum leverage, based on the following 
type of model: 
Suppose a standard random effects model of leverage for a firm i, i=1,2,…,I , in 




it t i it it
+ =





           (2)  
 where uit = fi + mt+ eit Estimating (2) in order to obtain a measure of optimal leverage is 
however far from ideal. Firms may not find it cost effective to adjust their debt ratios from 
year to year even if they are aware of the suboptimaility of the existing levels. Indeed, our 
analysis (see Table 4 and discussion in section 2) suggests that in the ‘normal period’ up to 
1994, leverage rates at the firm level showed very little fluctuation from year to year. It is 
clear from Table 4 that the worst affected countries experienced sudden increase in the range 
of leverage from around 1993/94 when problems appeared in their equity valuations. This 
suggests that the optimum leverage for a firm does not vary from year to year, so any 
prediction of optimal leverage based on annual variation is likely to overestimate the   9 
volatility of optimal leverage rates. In order to redress this, we use group means estimates of 
leverage during the n ormal years to generate predictions about the optimum leverage for 
firms in our sample countries. Summing both sides of (2) over T periods and then taking the 
average yields the following group means:  
i i i u X DE
- - -
+ = ' b       (3) 
Thus in the light of our sample, the long run leverage level obtained from (3) is argued to be a 
more reliable estimate of the optimal leverage of a firm than one based on cross sectional or 
intertemporal variation.   
  Following the trade-off theory, market valuations and profitability of firms are 
important  determinants  of optimum leverage in a world characterised by market 
imperfections and informational problems. This is accounted for by including profit margin 
in the determination of optimal leverage. In addition, we include a measure of the deviation 
of actual capital (K) from the corresponding optimal (K*); the latter (K-K*)
8 is taken to be a 
measure of  over-investment, if any.
9 Finally, we control for firm size and use natural 
logarithm of total sales as the  relevant  size variable. In order to reduce the extent of 
simultaneity bias, we use one period lagged values of market valuation and profitability in 
determining optimal leverage. 
This allows us to derive the  group means of observed leverage in the normal years for 
each of the sample countries (see Table 3). Subsequently these group means estimates are 




3.1.2. The dynamics of capital adjustment 
The baseline dynamic adjustment model (1) can be estimated,
11 and values of b derived for 
each country in order to determine the average speed of adjustment. The results from this 
estimation are presented in table A2 in the  Appendix. These illustrate that the speed of 
                                                 
8 The econometric approach to modelling the optimal capital stock of the firm is discussed at length in the 
Appendix. Also note that we include both the nominal and the absolute deviation of actual capital stock from its 
optimal. The latter allows us to account for the possibility of non-linearity in this respect. 
9 We have also experimented with other possible variables like some measure of bankruptcy and interest 
coverage (as a measure of loan default of firms), but none of these variables turned out to be significant in our 
samples.  
10 This is different from the normal convention in the literature where the optimal leverage is considered to vary 
over the years for each firm.  
11 Note that the baseline model does not include any of other explanatory variables.  
   10 
adjustment coefficients are significant, but that the average speed of adjustment is 
significantly less than 1. .  
While these results are instructive up to a point, it is  likely that the inclination and 
ability of individual firms to adjust to equilibrium will vary across time, depending on the 
circumstances of the firm and the time period. As such therefore, it is possible to re-write (1) 
as: 
it it i it it DE DE DE e b a + - + = D - ) ( 1
*       (4) 
 
Where DEi
*  is the optimal leverage obtained from first stage group means estimates
12 (see 
section 3.1.1) and   
 
bit = b0it + b1it * (K-K*) + b2it * |K-K*| + b3it * (DE-DE*) +b4it * |DE-DE*|  + b5it * (SALES) 
+ b6it * CRISIS + b7it* (DE<0) + b8it* (DE=0)    (5) 
 
In other words, the speed of adjustment in specification (5) is assumed to vary among firms, 
and is determined by a vector of variables, both real and financial. The estimation of (5) then 
allows one to generate firm-specific estimates of speeds of adjustment. 
Among  the possible determinants of the speed of adjustment towards the optimal 
leverage, we include firm size (SALES), the nominal (K-K*) and absolute |K - K*| deviations 
of actual capital stock from the corresponding optimum, profitability (PROFIT), stock returns 
(SR), and also a crisis dummy (CRISIS) to account for any structural break around the time 
of the crisis.
13  
In addition, we experimented with a number of variables that would capture the 
distress under which a firm is operating. It is important to identify the firms under distress 
since compared with other relatively better-off firms, the behaviour of these distressed firms 
could affect the speed of adjustment. In particular, we tried to include the conventional 
measure of distress, e.g., cash flow as a share of current liability, interest coverage (interest 
payments as a share of cash flow) and debt coverage (total debt + interest payments as a share 
of cash flow) ratios. However, this generated problems of multicollinearity. As an alternative, 
we include two dummy variables, namely, if DE=0 and DE<0. All firms in our sample had 
                                                 
12 Note that this could give rise to the problem of heteroscedasticity. This is addressed in our estimation method 
(see section 3.1.3). 
13 We experiment with a number of possible definitions of the CRISIS dummy. In the final results summarised 
in Table 6, the CRISIS variable is defined as follows: CRISIS =1 if year =97-99 and 0 otherwise.   11 
some equity finance and thus DE=0 for those firms who were unsuccessful to raise any 
external debt in a given year presumably because they could not qualify for it (e.g., because 
of low profitability or market valuation). More importantly DE<0 if firms experience 
negative equity valuation in some years. It is important to identify these two groups of firms, 
as f or most firms with a negative equity valuation, total debt fell in subsequent years, the 
trend being similar across all countries in the sample. This suggests that these firms had 
obtained significant debt leading up to the period of negative equity, but did not take on (or 
could not obtain) further debt subsequently. Further, the ratio of long term debt to total debt is 
very low for these firms, between 19% and 36% for these all countries except in Korea, 
where it is 53%. These firms have therefore been mainly surviving by taking on short term 
debt. Not surprisingly, these firms report significant losses, for almost all of these firms, cash 
flow and EBIT is negative. Q is also negative by definition. 
 
3.1.3 Estimation  Method 
Due to the inclusion of a lagged change in D/E ratios on the left hand side of equation (1), 
and given that the model is estimated within a panel framework, ordinary least squares cannot 
be applied. Rather, one has to use the generalised method of moments estimator following 
Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991) employing instrumental variables. This is because, within a 
panel framework, the "lagged levels" variables are treated as being pre-determined. The 
estimation procedure that is employed here is outlined in some detail by Sevestre and 
Trognon (1996). This approach is common for example in labour demand modelling, where a 
non-linear adjustment process is assumed. For further discussion  of this, see Hamermesh 
(1995).  
It is possible that heteroskedasticity is introduced into the dynamic model, as by 
construction the error term from (4) is related to the changes in the X term from (2). The 
estimation procedure generates heteroscedasticity consistent estimates by employing White’s 
correction.  
In general our data covers a period of 1989-2002 for each firm, which in turn provides 
a panel of thirteen annual differences. Allowing for the use of lags and instruments, this 
provides a panel of ten years in differences on which the partial adjustment equation can be 
estimated. 
  The multiple correlation coefficient squared R
2 and its adjusted value are routinely 
used in most models as a measure of goodness of fit. There are however, problems of using 
R
2 in a regression model estimated by instrumental variable (IV) methods, as outlined by   12 
Pesaran and Smith (1994). As an alternative, we use two possible indicators of goodness of 
fit: (a) Pesaran and Smith (1994) generalised R
2 commonly abbreviated as GR
2. (b) We also 
calculate a second measure, which is the correlation between predicted values of the change 
in leverage from GMM estimation and the actual values of the change. 
 
Diagnostic tests:  
 
Exogeneity of instruments (Sargan’s test): In a regression model estimated by IV method, it 
is important to test for the exogeneity of instruments to ensure the consistency of estimates. 
Sargan (1976) proposed a general procedure in this respect that involves the examination of 
the covariance between IV residuals and the set of instruments used. Sargan derived a chi-
square test criterion by obtaining the asymptotic null distribution of the scaled covariance 
vector. This chi-square test is used here to test for exogeneity of instruments used. 
  
Serial Correlation: When estimating panel data models by GMM, the consistency of the 
estimator relies on the assumption of no serial correlation. We therefore test for 1
st and 2
nd 
order serial correlation, and with differenced data, to quote Doornik et al (2002) “there should 
be evidence of significant negative first order serial correlation in the differences residuals, 
and no evidence of second order correlation”. The appropriate AR1 and AR2 tests are then 
based on average residual autovariances, which are asymptotically distributed N(0,1).  
 
 
3.2.   Results 
In this subsection, we present and analyse the estimates of optimal leverage as well as the 
firm-specific speed of adjustment towards the optimum leverage, contingent on the estimates 
of the optimal leverage.  
 
3.2.1.   Estimates of optimal leverage 
We determine the group means estimates of optimal leverage for the normal years.
14 These 
estimates are summarised in Table 5A. Our main findings are as follows: (a) Firms with 
higher valuation had lower leverage, as has been predicted by trade-off models with 
asymmetric information. (b) For given values of other variables, firms with a larger deviation 
                                                 
14 Depending on the experience of the sample countries, definition of normal years varies:    13 
of K from K* generally had higher leverage, presumably indicating the aspect of debt-funded 
over-investment in these firms. (c) Firm size or firm efficiency was not however significant 
in determining long-run leverage in terms of group means estimates.  
  While there are many similarities across the countries, this pattern is not uniform. 
Firms with higher market valuation in all countries have a lower dependence on external 
debt. Deviation of actual capital stock from its optimum is important and in most sample 
countries (except Indonesia, Malaysia and Hong Kong) firms  with  greater deviation from 
optimum capital stock had significantly greater optimal debt-equity ratio. However, firm size 
and profitability is not significant in most countries, except Thailand. In Thailand, 
coefficients of both firm size and profitability are significant and  hence, ceteris paribus, 
larger firms and firms with higher profitability had significantly higher leverage. 
  Using these group means estimates we generate the estimates of long-run optimum 
leverage, and then calculate the deviation of actual leverage from the optimum. Distributions 
of these deviations are summarised in Table 5B for the sample countries for the three sub-
periods, 1989-94, 1995-97 and 1998-2002. This demonstrates that the average deviation (both 
mean and median) increased markedly in the build up to the crisis period 1995-97 for all 
countries. The magnitude of these increases however is smaller for Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan. More importantly, only Korea among the worst affected countries shows any 
evidence of an apparent adjustment process.   
    
3.2.2. Dynamic estimates and speeds of adjustment  
Table 6 displays the estimates of dynamic adjustment process in the sample countries. These 
estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent in that the covariance matrix is adjusted for 
White’s correction. Two measures of goodness of fit are presented for each case. The first is 
the generalised r -squared (GR
2) for instrumental variable estimation (Pesaran and 
Smith,1994), while the second is the more common square of the correlation between the 
actual and fitted dependent variable. In general, there is evidence of good fit for differences 
data in each case. Secondly, P-values from  the Sargan test are shown in the Table, which 
suggest that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for all cases. The tests for 
serial correlation (negative first order, positive second order) are also presented for each case, 
which  confirm the absence of any serial correlation problem here.
15  
                                                 
15 Table A3 in the Appendix also presents the estimates of an alternative specifications, using only real variables 
(excluding the stock returns variable) and suggest that our primary findings remain almost the same. In fact the   14 
The results vary among the sample countries, though patterns emerge when 
comparing the worst affected countries with the others. Most notably, firm size is significant 
in all the worst affected countries, but not in the comparator countries. In all the worst 
affected countries, larger firms seem to have a slower pace of adjustment in leverage. With 
the exception of Malaysia, the coefficient on (K-K*)  is  significant  and negative. This 
indicates that the greater the nominal deviation of K from K*, the slower is the pace of 
adjustment. One interpretation of this is that firms that built up an excessively large capital 
stock (relative to its optimal) find it impossible to reduce their leverage, even when facing a 
crisis of the magnitude suggested here. There is also significant evidence of asymmetry in the 
adjustment of leverage with respect to K -K*, as the absolute term is also significant, 
suggesting that firms with only a small deviation from K* are unable/unwilling to adjust their 
leverage.  
Firm performance, as measured by profit margin, plays a significant role, especially in 
Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, but not in Thailand. More profitable firms in Indonesia and 
Korea had higher speed of adjustment though the result was opposite in Malaysia. Similarly, 
coefficients of stock returns are not significant in the comparator countries, though these are 
significant in three of t he four worst affected countries, namely,  Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand. While the coefficient is positive and significant in Korea and Malaysia, it is 
negative in Thailand. In other words, firms with higher stock returns generally experienced 
higher speed of adjustment in Korea and Malaysia and those in Thailand, in contrast, had 
lower speed of adjustment. Distress variables are significant too, especially in the worst 
affected countries. In particular, firms with negative equity valuation experienced slower 
speed of adjustment in Indonesia and Thailand though the same did not hold for Korea. Firms 
with zero debt (in some years) too had however higher pace of adjustment in Korea, Malaysia 
and Thailand. However, the crisis dummy turned out to be significant and positive for the 
countries except Taiwan. The latter tends to indicate that compared with other years the speed 
of adjustment was generally  significantly higher during the crisis period. It is possible that 
firms responded to the crisis by adjusting faster. The latter could be facilitated by various 
restructuring programmes (e.g., debt-equity swaps, raising new equity or increasing the 
existing equity values) introduced to fight the crisis. 
Finally, we calculate the distribution of the firm-specific speeds of adjustment (Table 
7) and compare these estimates across the sample countries.  (a) With the exception of 
                                                                                                                                                        
goodness of fit measures decrease marginally for Indonesia,Korea, Thailand and even increases for the rest of 
the sample countries. We however focus on the estimates of the full model for the rest of the paper.    15 
Indonesia, mean speed in all  the worst affected countries is significantly different from the 
median speed; in the comparator countries the difference between mean and median is much 
less. (b) Compared to the rest of the countries, the maximum speed is significantly higher for 
Indonesia and Malaysia. (c) Mean and median speeds of adjustment are close to unity in 
Hong Kong while in all other countries they are less than unity (the lowest is observed in 
Indonesia being close to 0.10).  If, however, we compare the distribution of speed of 
adjustment between firms with positive and negative leverage, mean as well as median speed 
of adjustment is significantly higher among firms with negative leverage (i.e., those with 
negative equity valuation). Thus these distressed firms (with negative equity valuation) seem 
to have a greater inclination to change their capital structure than the relatively better off 
firms (those with positive equity valuation). Leverage can be reduced either by debt-equity swaps, 
raising new equity or increasing the value of existing equity. Assuming that the relatively better-off 
firms were not under restructuring, the first option would  not be available for the better off firms 
while the  other two available  options  may not be working for the better off firms due to  
stock market collapse around the crisis period. 
To summarise, there are significant deviations of actual leverage from the optimal 
among firms in the worst affected countries, especially in the build up to the crisis period. We 
identified a number of  both real and f inancial variables
16 playing significant roles in the 
dynamic adjustment process. These results suggest signs of corporate inertia among firms in 
the  worst affected countries, exhibiting evidence of lack of adjustment in their capital 
structure. This is true especially for the relatively better off firms; larger firms in Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand; more profitable firms in Malaysia and Thailand and firms with higher 
stock returns in Indonesia and Thailand. Transaction and other indirect costs based theories 
seem to provide little support to explain this apparent lack of inclination/ability of these firms 
to adjust their capital structure, although they are rather active in other respects. These 
findings may on the other hand support the moral hazard argument of bad loans in poorly 
regulated economies where even relatively better off firms can afford not to respond to adjust 
their capital structure towards the optimum. One could  also bring in  other  alternative 
explanations e.g., Pecking Order of funds or managerial entrenchment behaviour to explain 
this corporate behaviour. We however have not access to appropriate data to test the validity 
of these alternative explanations.  
 
                                                 
16 Estimates presented in Table A3 in the Appendix suggest the relative importance of the real variables (e.g., 
sales, profit margin) in comparison to the financial variable like stock returns.   16 
4.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A series of macroeconomic studies  have  identified  a standard  moral hazard  problem  of 
excessive borrowing and overinvestment in the east Asian economies. While it is suggested 
that this was a key factor in the recent Asian crisis, there is hitherto little firm-level evidence 
to corroborate it. The present paper aims to contribute to filling the gap in the literature and 
examines leverage at the firm level, as well as the dynamics of leverage adjustment.  
The results obtained from firm-level panel data suggest that higher quality firms had 
lower optimal leverage while firms with greater than the optimum capital stock had higher 
optimal leverage required to fund the excessive capital stock installation. Importantly, there 
are signs of corporate inertia among firms in the worst affected countries, as leverage adjusts 
only very slowly in such firms, and slower still in larger firms. This is true especially for the 
relatively better performing  firms in Malaysia and Thailand, and  firms with higher stock 
returns in Indonesia and Thailand. These results seem to strengthen the moral hazard 
argument of bad loans in poorly regulated and supervised east Asian economies. 
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Table. 1. Number of  Sample Firms, 1989-2002 
  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand  Indonesia  Taiwan  Hong Kong 
               
1989  75 




































































































































































































Note: Number in the parentheses give the corresponding number excluding the outliers in 
each sample. 
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Table 2. Use and Composition of External Finance  
  External Finance/total Finance 
(%) 
Composition of External Financing (%) 
    new debt   new equity  
Korea       
Pre-crisis  59.88  88.11  11.89 
Post-crisis  43.35  78.50  21.50 
Thailand       
Pre-crisis  34.61  60.06  39.94 
Post-crisis  14.93  73.92  26.08 
Malaysia       
Pre-crisis  29.91  38.24  61.76 
Post-crisis  21.35  29.83  70.17 
Indonesia       
Pre-crisis  32.79  77.77  22.23 
Post-crisis  10.51  86.06  13.94 
Singapore       
Pre-crisis  31.15  58.95  41.05 
Post-crisis  29.84  57.88  42.12 
Hong Kong       
Pre-crisis  33.37  65.95  34.05 
Post-crisis  31.11  61.04  38.96 
Taiwan       
Pre-crisis  27.48  79.83  20.17 
Post-crisis  21.27  76.73  23.27 
 
   21 
Table 3A: Selected Sample Characteristics 
 
  Averages over the Period 



















Korea             
1989-94  2.37  0.58  0.35  0.14  0.75  8.05 
1995-97  2.73  0.62  0.36  0.12  0.91  10.79 
1998-02  1.28  0.61  0.45  0.14  0.55  -8.02 
Indonesia             
1989-94  0.70  0.77  0.38  0.55  0.26  1.76 
1995-97  1.02  0.67  0.40  0.34  -0.09  -5.59 
1998-02  0.32  0.68  0.43  0.22  0.05  -0.73 
Malaysia             
1989-94  0.44  0.78  0.74  0.45  0.11  2.37 
1995-97  0.80  0.75  0.70  0.40  0.22  4.00 
1998-02  0.65  0.73  0.70  0.28  -0.43  -4.24 
Singapore             
1989-94  0.39  0.78  0.34  0.38  0.23  4.35 
1995-97  0.58  0.76  0.38  0.29  0.34  6.60 
1998-02  0.61  0.78  0.40  0.27  0.10  3.04 
Thailand             
1989-94  0.89  0.77  0.42  0.48  -0.19  -1.21 
1995-97  1.06  0.70  0.45  0.27  0.53  3.35 
1998-02  0.78  0.69  0.47  0.35  0.13  1.68 
Taiwan             
1989-94  0.44  0.73  0.71  0.54  0.20  2.83 
1995-97  0.49  0.70  0.58  0.50  1.96  31.03 
1998-02  0.61  0.69  0.55  0.35  0.13  1.70 
Hong 
Kong 
           
1989-94  0.47  0.75  0.66  0.52  0.630  7.07 
1995-97  0.56  0.75  0.56  0.32  0.142  3.47 
1998-02  0.38  0.80  0.58  0.14  0.105  2.29 
 
Note: [1] Negative figures correspond to the cases where earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) are negative.   22 
Table 3B. Adjusted and Unadjusted Leverage 
 
  Thailand  Indonesia  Malaysia  Korea  Taiwan  Singapore  Hong Kong 
  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
1989  0.74  0.74  1.11  1.11  0.88  0.61  1.71  1.37  0.39  0.39  0.31  0.3  0.53  0.42 
1990  0.87  0.87  0.77  0.67  0.50  0.41  2.22  1.78  0.34  0.34  0.38  0.37  0.49  0.43 
1991  0.89  0.89  0.52  0.51  0.42  0.36  3.24  3.10  0.52  0.52  0.39  0.38  0.61  0.55 
1992  0.96  0.93  0.63  0.6  0.41  0.36  3.02  2.70  0.51  0.51  0.44  0.41  0.55  0.49 
1993  0.95  0.94  0.65  0.61  0.55  0.49  2.65  2.60  0.45  0.45  0.51  0.48  0.47  0.42 
1994  0.99  0.99  0.72  0.68  0.52  0.43  2.68  2.65  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.42  0.50  0.48 
1995  1.14  1.08  0.88  0.85  0.68  0.61  2.65  2.63  0.47  0.46  0.51  0.48  0.62  0.61 
1996  1.29  1.2  0.99  0.96  0.87  0.8  2.89  2.85  0.51  0.49  0.62  0.6  0.61  0.58 
1997  1.92  0.90  2.09  1.20  1.08  0.98  3.60  2.70  0.53  0.52  0.69  0.67  0.52  0.48 
1998  1.73  1.10  3.98  1.55  1.19  0.9  2.65  2.07  0.65  0.63  0.84  0.82  0.54  0.45 
1999  1.48  0.77  2.40  0.53  1.20  0.83  1.46  0.89  0.64  0.62  0.62  0.57  0.54  0.41 
2000  1.43  0.76  2.87  -1.30  0.99  0.59  1.68  0.98  0.69  0.67  0.60  0.55  0.46  0.37 
2001  1.24  0.72  2.34  0.79  0.88  0.45  1.48  1.11  0.69  0.65  0.63  0.57  0.46  0.35 
2002  1.3  0.56  1.85  -0.81  0.97  0.50  1.66  1.35  0.67  0.64  0.63  0.56  0.47  0.33 
 
Note: A- dropping 2% of outliers and leverage<=0 
          B- dropping 2% of outliers only     23 
Table 4. Range of Observed Leverages, 1989-2002 
 
  Mean  Max  Min  Range  Mean  Max  Min  Range 
  Indonesia  Hong Kong 
1989  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.525  2.903  0.004  2.898 
1990  0.773  2.174  0.001  2.173  0.489  2.826  0.000  2.825 
1991  0.524  3.893  0.003  3.891  0.609  3.055  0.004  3.051 
1992  0.629  1.823  0.004  1.818  0.551  3.062  0.001  3.061 
1993  0.653  1.653  0.003  1.650  0.473  2.185  0.002  2.183 
1994  0.715  2.293  0.001  2.292  0.502  2.402  0.001  2.401 
1995  0.880  2.868  0.002  2.866  0.615  2.710  0.001  2.709 
1996  0.989  3.086  0.000  3.086  0.593  3.062  -2.172  5.234 
1997  1.224  11.936  -28.689  40.626  0.499  2.288  -2.926  5.214 
1998  1.618  33.056  -24.994  58.050  0.467  2.807  -2.846  5.653 
1999  0.572  28.056  -15.720  43.776  0.432  3.176  -2.942  6.118 
2000  -1.414  18.468  -143.825  162.293  0.404  3.174  -1.705  4.880 
2001  0.828  30.955  -14.562  45.516  0.394  3.129  -2.662  5.792 
2002  -0.887  35.530  -149.002  184.532  0.393  3.200  -3.277  6.476 
  Korea  Singapore 
1989  1.367  6.594  -7.307  13.900  0.306  1.0992  0.0000  1.0992 
1990  1.777  12.149  -8.746  20.895  0.379  2.4455  0.0008  2.4447 
1991  3.103  24.197  -2.166  26.363  0.394  2.4399  0.0002  2.4398 
1992  2.736  20.473  -10.254  30.727  0.441  2.9355  0.0004  2.9351 
1993  2.625  17.796  -0.602  18.398  0.507  2.9142  0.0037  2.9104 
1994  2.653  23.322  -0.715  24.036  0.447  2.4102  0.0004  2.4098 
1995  2.626  23.427  -0.715  24.142  0.512  2.7367  0.0016  2.7351 
1996  2.867  26.100  -1.164  27.263  0.624  4.5465  0.0003  4.5462 
1997  2.715  21.889  -14.925  36.814  0.686  5.1308  0.0001  5.1308 
1998  2.127  21.967  -5.359  27.326  0.841  8.2175  0.0024  8.2151 
1999  0.903  14.568  -7.503  22.070  0.620  4.1223  0.0007  4.1216 
2000  1.000  26.526  -14.801  41.327  0.587  7.5160  -1.0812  8.5971 
2001  1.134  10.098  -10.042  20.140  0.610  5.6898  -1.5013  7.1910 
2002  1.377  30.181  -16.134  46.314  0.594  8.5256  -1.5703  10.0959 
  Malaysia  Taiwan 
1989  0.793  12.279  -2.606  14.885  0.387  0.9829  0.1040  0.8788 
1990  0.502  3.720  0.000  3.720  0.338  0.8871  0.0438  0.8433 
1991  0.418  2.458  0.006  2.453  0.524  1.5066  0.0079  1.4988 
1992  0.408  4.971  0.000  4.971  0.511  1.1422  0.0257  1.1166 
1993  0.549  13.629  0.000  13.629  0.453  1.7182  0.0072  1.7109 
1994  0.478  3.109  -2.571  5.680  0.435  1.4514  0.0006  1.4507 
1995  0.670  5.107  -1.801  6.908  0.471  2.0575  0.0040  2.0535 
1996  0.872  5.473  0.001  5.473  0.507  2.4194  0.0039  2.4154 
1997  1.063  11.994  -1.245  13.239  0.532  2.6387  0.0001  2.6386 
1998  0.966  9.112  -6.045  15.156  0.652  5.8630  0.0025  5.8606 
1999  0.896  11.886  -6.226  18.112  0.638  5.0303  0.0003  5.0300 
2000  0.638  13.033  -6.669  19.702  0.690  5.7555  0.0001  5.7554 
2001  0.487  8.823  -5.169  13.992  0.688  5.2809  0.0001  5.2808 
2002  0.548  14.931  -7.078  22.009  0.671  5.9339  0.0003  5.9337   24 
 
  Thailand         
  Mean  Max  Min  Range         
1989  0.736  2.143  0.069  2.073         
1990  0.873  2.923  0.007  2.917         
1991  0.892  4.281  0.001  4.280         
1992  0.957  6.046  0.002  6.044         
1993  0.951  4.142  0.001  4.141         
1994  0.999  6.168  0.000  6.168         
1995  1.091  3.800  -7.159  10.959         
1996  1.204  6.079  -7.134  13.213         
1997  0.907  7.770  -14.511  22.281         
1998  1.104  9.166  -11.536  20.702         
1999  0.783  8.674  -12.849  21.523         
2000  0.803  7.680  -9.672  17.352         
2001  0.764  8.721  -12.740  21.461         
2002  0.600  9.205  -14.632  23.837         
 
 
Table 5A. Group means estimates of leverage 
 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  Hong 
Kong 
Singapore  Taiwan 
























































































27.76**  42.00  7.53**  36.68**  10.61**  18.32**  41.35** 
Normal 
period 
1989-95  1989-92  1989-92  1989-93  1989-94  1989-96  1989-96 
 
Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level and ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower 
level.   25 
Table 5B. Distribution of the deviation of actual leverage from the long-run optimum 
 
  Excluding outliers  All Firms 
Thailand  Mean  Max.  Min.  Median  Mean  Max.  Min.  Median 
1989-94  0.45  3.11  0.01  0.28  462.48  87254.88  0.01  0.28 
1995-97  2.18  37.26  0.00  0.85  716.33  130941.49  0.00  0.88 
1998-02  2.78  52.40  0.01  0.91  734.89  130940.46  0.01  0.96 
Malaysia               
1989-94  0.29  6.08  0.00  0.09  0.29  6.08  0.00  0.09 
1995-97  0.78  11.48  0.00  0.37  6.85  1635.25  0.00  0.37 
1998-02  1.67  78.52  0.00  0.43  2.55  245.58  0.00  0.44 
Korea               
1989-94  1.22  29.21  0.01  0.67  5.28  504.91  0.01  0.68 
1995-97  3.20  66.41  0.01  1.17  13.67  1272.66  0.01  1.22 
1998-02  2.88  111.67  0.01  0.78  7.40  583.56  0.01  0.78 
Singapore               
1989-94  0.25  1.58  0.01  0.14  0.26  1.58  0.01  0.14 
1995-97  0.40  3.08  0.00  0.23  0.40  3.08  0.00  0.24 
1998-02  0.79  50.78  0.00  0.28  1.46  160.58  0.00  0.28 
Hong Kong               
1989-94  0.50  5.22  0.01  0.20  0.50  5.22  0.01  0.20 
1995-97  0.72  25.89  0.00  0.29  0.74  25.89  0.00  0.30 
1998-02  0.73  26.69  0.00  0.22  6.75  1580.08  0.00  0.22 
Indonesia               
1989-94  0.46  6.82  0.03  0.28  0.46  6.82  0.03  0.29 
1995-97  1.24  21.76  0.01  0.52  1.23  21.76  0.01  0.51 
1998-02  4.06  110.36  0.02  1.26  6.22  201.12  0.02  1.29 
Taiwan                 
1989-94          0.17  0.59  0.02  0.14 
1995-97          0.22  1.43  0.00  0.16 
1998-02          0.65  38.82  0.00  0.32 
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Table 6. Estimates of speed of adjustment towards the optimum leverage 
 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  Hong 
Kong 
Singapore  Taiwan 























































































































(3.27)   
0.013986* 
(1.73)   
(DE <0) *DD  -.548083* 
(1.92) 
0.55204** 
(2.78)   
-0.22566** 
(3.07)       














Sargan’s test  0.182122  0.282839  0.145139  0.346085  0.193728  0.452392  0.297495 
GR
2  0.0410  0.22219  0.25675  0.51529  0.37587  0.2836  0.51529 



































Note: [1] DD = (DE-DE*). * denotes significance at 10% or lower level and ‘**’ denotes the 
same at 1% or lower level. All estimates use White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
                                                 
￿ The AR1 tests presented here and in table A2 are for negative serial correlation, following Doornik et al 
(2002)   27 
Table 7. Distribution of speeds of adjustment among all firms  
 
 





Worst affected countries  Comparator countries 
  All firms  All firms  DE >0  DE <0  DE >0  DE <0 
  Indonesia  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Hong Kong 
Mean  0.099832  0.980763  0.056679364  0.910544403  0.982248  0.821923 
SD  2.382381  3.140999  2.399906583  2.069240085  3.186168  3.408418 
MAX  20.55784  6.108971  20.16545426  0.986447268  6.169905  4.615028 
MIN  7.87E-06  0.076985  7.96898E-06  5.11071E-05  0.075455  0.378969 
SKEW  -0.32444  0.351798  -0.332067826  -0.18036737  0.363435  0.024536 
Median  0.096761  1.013486  0.054918668  0.895180847  1.015643  0.82381 
  Korea  Singapore  Korea  Singapore 
Mean  0.669293  0.277122  0.658799681  0.881164526  0.260929  0.647573 
SD  10.10589  0.861272  10.42348082  6.215243608  0.875285  0.420917 
MAX  2.652618  8.316869  2.201220747  2.636760331  8.335354  0.009458 
MIN  7.77E-08  1.45E-08  0.030240538  7.93101E-08  1.45E-08  5.7E-05 
SKEW  2.470208  1.303362  2.346731415  4.242598005  1.375201  -0.10833 
Median  0.826095  0.311378  0.803426691  1.230885379  0.294497  0.641011 
  Malaysia  Taiwan  Malaysia  Taiwan 
Mean  0.486046  0.261653  0.422084353  1.81287123  0.208732  1.322471 
SD  4.328506  0.782967  4.38265348  4.505682405  0.68741  2.315163 
MAX  16.49108  7.12772  3.6078812  16.245047  7.07018  6.132073 
MIN  3.27E-08  5.13E-08  3.26181E-08  0.820172831  5.08E-08  0.050327 
SKEW  -1.57884  1.878981  -1.803252695  2.620893192  1.885533  2.394355 
Median  0.413265  0.308281  0.350882961  2.257347848  0.24555   
  Thailand    Thailand     
Mean  0.547292    0.520780383  0.820702712     
SD  0.671246    0.666878863  0.641582137     
MAX  2.443896    2.502566643  1.656763951     
MIN  1.45E-05    1.42864E-05  0.446126151     
SKEW  -1.1424    -1.208470029  -0.316982346     
Median  0.487994    0.461906437  0.796366466     
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Figure 2. Trend in tangible assets, 1989-2002 
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APPENDIX 
 
 Determination of optimal capital stock 
Before embarking on the determination of optimal leverage and the dynamic adjustment of 
actual leverage to the optimum, we first determine the optimal capital stock and its deviation 
from the actual since it plays an important role in our analysis. 
  We only observe actual capital stock K, but not the optimal capital stock K*. So as a 
first step, we need to determine K*. Standard models of the optimal level of capital services 
are based on the work of Nickell (1979), Pfann (1996), or Thomsen (2000) which makes use 
of a simple structural model of the capital market. Output (Q) allows for any exogenous 
change in local output, either due to change in demand in the product market, or the 
relocation decision of the firm for example. However, the development of a firm’s capital 
stock is generally assumed to follow a partial adjustment process, as the firm moves to wards 
optimal capital levels. Partial adjustment arises because firms are presumed to operate in 
imperfect capital markets that prevents them from fully adjusting when financial structure 
deviates from its target and also prevent optimal funding of new investment spending. The 
primary hypothesis in this case is that the speed of adjustment coefficients is positive but less 
than unity, see f or example Hall (1992), Nickell (1979ii). For empirical treatments of this 
type of model, see Barrell and Pain (1996) or Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) for 
example.  
We estimate the optimal capital stock using a standard fixed effects estimator, though 
this was tested against group means estimator and the dynamic fixed effects model following 
Arrellano and Bond (1989). compared with the estimates from the various procedures were 
very similar, and the (within) fixed effects estimates were employed to generate the optimal 
capital stock K* in our sample. A further consideration here is the larger number of 
observations that it generates compared with the dynamic model, requiring lags and 
instruments.  
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Table A1. Number of firms, total observations in the dynamic estimates  
 





Indonesia            
Firms  114  105  114  67   
No of obs  474  105  302  67   
Korea          1994-2001 
Firms  40  40  38  35   
No of obs  298  115  113  78   
Malaysia          1996-2001 
Firms  200  200  200  176   
No of obs  1067  200  532  335   
Thailand          1996-2001 
Firms  147  147  128  102   
No of obs  602  147  353  102   
Hong 
Kong 
        1996-2001 
Firms  186  165  186  175   
No of obs  1002  165  499  337   
Singapore          1996-2001 
Firms  112  85  106  112   
No of obs  571  85  289  197   
Taiwan          1996-2002 
Firms  277  80  165  277   
No of obs  1003  80  475  448   
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Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .0036946  .053441  .069135  [.945] 
b1  .285148  .042651  6.68557**  [.000] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    5.623215 (.01772) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    2.398745 (.12143) 
Sargan  5.70988 [.335] 
GR
2  0.214 
Malaysia  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .013993  .221187  .063263  [.950] 
b1  .21000  .059903  3.50565**  [.000] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    5.025841 (.02497) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    1.258741 (.26189) 
Sargan  2.74844 [.739] 
GR
2  0.275 
Korea  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .136301  .073413  1.85662*  [.063] 
b1  .419420  .058716  7.14320**  [.153] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    2.658740 (.10298) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    1.897452 (.16836) 
Sargan  7.412740 [.192] 
GR
2  0.202 
Indonesia  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .175213  .457331  .383121  [.702] 
b1  .298406  .030999  9.62633**  [.000] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    4.369874 (.03658) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    2.389565 (.12215) 
Sargan  6.139860 [.189] 
GR
2  0.269 
Hong Kong  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .048481  .117621  .412175  [.680] 
b1  .544955  .020625  26.4224**  [.000] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    3.078456 (.07934) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    2.565874 (.10919) 
Sargan  6.20216 [.287] 
GR
2  0.382 
Taiwan  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .430163  .110785  3.88285**  [.000] 
b1  .392536  .072837  5.38922**  [.000] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    3.178452 (.07462) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    1.369548 (.24189) 
Sargan  8.59995 [.126] 
GR
2  0.382 
Thailand  Estimate  Standard error  T statistic  P-value 
a  .460896  .133168  3.46101**  [.001] 
b1  .219195  .085792  2.55497**  [.011] 
AR1~ c
2(1) (p-value)    3.257841 (.07108) 
AR2~ c
2(1) (p-value)    1.658745 (.19777) 
Sargan  2.09816 [.552] 
GR
2  0.358 
 
Note: All estimates use White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table A3. Dynamic Estimates of Speed of Adjustment (excluding SR) 
 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  Hong 
kong 
Singapore  Taiwan 














a  .288306  -.0502491  -.011119*  -.177882  -.081718  -.004979  .041675
* 
DD  .211270  -.3912**  -.008127*  -.29567**  .400690  -1.02316*  .04006* 
(K-K*)*DD  -.336854**  -.4259**  -.20637**  -.41272**  .87159**  -.64677**  -.0394** 
|K-K*|*DD  .706438**  -0.253**  .13051**  -.52096**  .128772  .21101**  .6018** 
Sales*DD  -.000519**  -.0323**  .00141**  -.02905**  -.00064**  .065241  .051257 
PROFIT*DD  .392742**  -.8399**  -.29287**  -.0691037  .338611*  -.410033  -.094745 
(DE=0) *DD  .2302744**  .01834**  0.028745  .54205**    0.024698   
(DE <0) *DD  -0.68527*  0.6841**    -.34975**    -.   
CRISIS*DD  0.25656**  1.5841**  0.543698  .28364**  .25372**  1.0247**  0.27895 





2  0.387  0.2198.  0.25177  0.2406  .485  0.511  0.4995 
Corr(y,y ˆ )  0.399  0.3087  0.3137  0.45874  0.3357  0.368  0.3568 
 
Note: [1] DD = (DE-DE*). * denotes significance at 10% or lower level and ‘**’ denotes the 
same at 1% or lower level. All estimates use White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. 
 